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Introduction 
 Manifestos are one of the main means by which parties project their ‘brand’, chiefly 
by presenting policy prescriptions which collectively position them at clearly identifiable 
points along the political spectrum (Cwalina 2011: 25-26).   This essay focuses mainly on the 
manifestos of the two governing parties in the run up to the 2015 UK General Election, the 
Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats, as well as the main opposition party, Labour. 
It will also include the manifestos of the other leading ‘national parties’, the Green Party and 
UKIP. The essay does not discuss the manifestos of the parties whose electoral activities are 
confined to only one of the constituent nations of the UK, but, because of its prominence in 
the national (UK) campaign and the fact that it is the third largest party at Westminster, an 
exception has been made for the Scottish National Party (SNP). The following analysis 
focuses on the manifesto as a platform to project each party’s brand, as well as how that 
brand is communicated to the electorate through mini-campaigns and media events. Space 
does not allow a consideration of all policies, so, given that it was a key concern of the 
public, was central to the campaign and featured prominently in the main parties’ manifestos, 
economic policy is the main focus of this analysis.       
 
The manifesto as brand projection 
In addition to enabling the party to establish itself at a specific point on the political 
spectrum, the manifesto also gives parties the opportunity to project their reputation and 
trustworthiness. This ‘valence’ approach to politics, whereby parties seek to convince the 
electorate of their competence in broad areas that voters’ deem to be important, has become 
particularly significant in modern British politics as differences on individual policies have 
narrowed so much that there is little differentiation in the positions of the main parties.. An 
example of a valence issue is ‘a strong economy’ and, given its prominence in the 2015 
election, this paper focuses on just that issue (Whiteley et al. 2005: 148). 
 Many academic discussions on political marketing in the UK use Lees-Marshment 
tripartite schema of  the market-oriented party (MOP), the sales-oriented party (SOP) and the 
product-oriented party (POP) (Lees-Marshment 2008: 20, 30, 33). She argues that in 
contemporary democracies parties are primarily market-oriented, as evidenced by the 
continual use of market intelligence such as through focus groups and private polling. In this 
sense, like commercial marketing, parties are selling a product which they adjust in light of 
the feedback that they receive from the buyers, in this case the electorate (Lees-Marshment 
2008: 21-23) Lees-Marshment implies that the product is essentially each party’s manifesto 
and this is the understanding of others who have also used her MOP model (Lilleker and 
Negrine 2006: 38).  
 However, a major drawback of using this theoretical framework for this particular 
paper would be that it is difficult to measure empirically how the parties’ responded to – or 
adjusted their product – following feedback from the electorate. In the time and space 
available, it is not feasible to survey this interaction between the parties and the electorate. 
Instead, drawing on the work of Cwalina, Falkowski and Newman (2011), the paper 
examines the 2015 manifestos within the context of brand identity and valence. Here, the 
paper employs the two foundational layers of the four layer pyramid brand equity model, 
which is a modification of Keller’s (2001) non-political construct. The base layer is ‘brand 
salience’ and refers to the identity of parties, especially where they position themselves on 
the left-right spectrum. While the manifesto is an important facet of this positioning, it is 
important to note that this is established through the programme and associated 
pronouncements in their totality rather than through individual policies (Cwalina 2011: 25-
26). The next layer comprises ‘brand performance’ and ‘brand imagery’, where meaning is 
established when “consumers believe the brand has attributes and benefits that satisfy their 
needs and wants such that a positive overall brand attitude is formed” (Cwalina 2011: 26). If 
the first layer can be associated with brand identity, the second encapsulates the valence 
approach to political marketing that was explicated above, both of which approaches provide 
the theoretical framework for the study of the 2015 manifestos. The following analysis 
therefore is concentrated on the way in which parties’ project their own brand, as well as how 
they respond to the electorates’ most important valence issue, the parties’ respective capacity 
to run a strong economy.       
 
The manifestos’ role in promoting economic competence as brand identity 
The manifesto of the leading party in the 2010-2015 Coalition and subsequent outright 
winner of the 2015 election, the Conservative Party, was dominated by economic policies, 
with issues other than the economy, taxation or job creation barely featuring until page 27 of 
the 81 page document (Conservative Party 2015). The emphasis on its economic plan was the 
chief means in which it attempted to both defend its own record in government and 
differentiate it from the previous Labour government’s economic performance. This tone was 
established in the first sentence of David Cameron’s foreword, where he quoted the ill-
conceived words of the departing New Labour Treasury Minister Liam Byrne in 2010: “there 
is no [government] money” (Conservative Party 2015: 5). The Conservatives’ attempted to 
convince the reader of their trustworthiness by highlighting their setting up of the Office for 
Budgetary Responsibility (OBR), arguing that it gives independent verification of the 
soundness of their economic plan (Conservative Party 2015: 7). Interspersed with the plain 
black text of the manifesto were large blue and bolded italicised sentences as well as blue 
panels with a large single white text sentence in each, both of which occurred around once a 
page. On one occasion, the same phrase - “To eliminate the deficit we must continue to cut 
out wasteful spending” - appeared largely out of context on separate pages near the beginning 
and end of the manifesto, thus bookending the main message of the campaign (Conservative 
Party 2015: 9, 47).  
While the manifesto is an unashamed defence of traditional conservative policies, the 
emphasis on low taxation and help for new and existing home-owners was directed, as the 
Conservatives’ made explicit in their accompanying publicity, to ordinary “working people” 
(Conservative Party 2015a). This message was reinforced by the bold panelled message that: 
“The richest are paying a greater share of income tax than in any of Labour’s 13 years” 
(Conservative Party 2015: 9). The manifesto does not mention that, to the extent to which this 
is accurate, it was largely a result of the insistence of their coalition partner that the threshold 
at which tax was levied should be significantly raised (Ashcroft 2013). But it provided a 
convenient means of countering the oft-repeated criticism that the Conservative Party was, as 
it always had been, a party mainly for the rich. It weaved this message into policies, like 
health and education, where its austerity programme made it vulnerable, by asserting that 
these vital sectors of society could only be adequately supported if the economy was strong.    
 As perhaps expected from a party that had been in opposition for five years prior to 
the election and whose economic record in the latter years of its previous administration 
made it vulnerable, the Labour Party began its manifesto with an economic pledge in the 
form of the “Budget Responsibility Lock” (Labour Party 2015: 1). This Lock was much more 
prescriptive than would be expected of a manifesto, its main features being: 
 
• A promise that every single manifesto item would be paid for without additional 
borrowing 
• To bring forward legislation to ensure that in the future manifesto commitments from 
all parties would be audited by the OBR 
• The first line of the first Labour government budget would be “This budget cuts the 
deficit every year”. Subsequent budgets would be required to cut the deficit and this 
process would be audited by the OBR 
(Labour Party 2015: 1) 
 
This message was reinforced by the argument that the Coalition government had reneged on 
its promises on reducing the deficit: “The Conservative-led Government promised to balance 
the books in this Parliament. But this promise has been broken. The Conservatives will leave 
the country borrowing over £75 billion this year” (Labour Party 2015: 17). 
 The Labour Party’s manifesto emphasised traditional concerns relating to ‘fairness’ in 
taxation and measures to combat inequality. Surprisingly, though, discussion on the economy 
was lengthier than that on health and education combined, two issues Labour has traditionally 
focused on and where a sizeable number of the electorate believed that these services had 
declined under the Coalition government (The British Election Study Team 2015). This 
seeming lack of consistent messaging reflected a problem which at that time still bedevilled 
the Labour Party: to what extent was the New Labour brand still a part of its identity? Ed 
Miliband’s seeming rejection of the term as long ago as 2010 suggests that by 2015 it had 
very little relevance to the way in which the party presented itself. However, former 
government communications director Alastair Campbell lamented that his pleas to the party 
at the beginning of the Miliband’s leadership to challenge the Conservative Party’s narrative 
about the debt were ignored, thus hampering Labour’s stance on the issue: “When Miliband 
was elected leader, he felt uncomfortable defending the Blair-Brown record. He wanted to 
disassociate himself from the past and talk about the future” (quoted in Wintour 2015). 
Therefore, the view of the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats on the national debt 
gained traction with the electorate early in the previous parliament, assuming a valence that 
the Labour Party could not ignore in its manifesto. But, as Campbell intimated above, this 
was just the sort of issue that exposed the division in the party’s view of itself, between those 
who wanted to brand it as a social democratic movement  primarily concerned with 
addressing inequality and a more centrist, dare I say New-Labour-type-, party focused on 
fiscal rectitude. This resulted in the manifesto appearing to be at odds with some of Ed 
Miliband’s public pronouncements, so making it difficult for the party to project a clear 
message on the deficit (Wintour 2015). 
 The manifesto of the Conservatives’ junior coalition partner from 2010 to 2015, the 
Liberal Democrats, also devoted a considerable amount of content to the economy. However, 
the treatment of it was divided into two sections, “responsible finances” and “prosperity for 
all”, with the latter being more than twice as long (Liberal Democrats 2015). While the policy 
on deficit reduction outlined in the first section was broadly similar to the Conservatives’, the 
Liberal Democrats were keen to put distance between themselves and their erstwhile 
Coalition partner in emphasising, most prominently in a bold all-page graphic, that they 
would cut less from services and raise taxes where necessary (Liberal Democrats 2015: 19, 
20). This illustrates the delicate balancing act that the Liberal Democrats had to carry out in 
both defending their record in government, as the manifesto of a governing party should do, 
and making clear how they are distinct from their Coalition partner. This is difficult as it 
implied that the Liberal Democrats were opposed to some Coalition policies, not unsurprising 
given that it was the junior partner. Thus it is noticeable that the first section on responsible 
finances was not only short (five pages including a one page graphic) but also did not employ 
the striking tabular “a record of delivery” boxes highlighting the translation of 2010 
manifesto commitments into government policy that other sections did (Liberal Democrats 
2015). This suggests that the Liberal Democrats’ differed from the Conservatives in their 
approach to cutting the deficit during the Coalition period itself, even if for obvious reasons 
this could not be expressed in its manifesto.  
But this also reflected divisions within the Liberal Democrats between fiscal hawks and those 
who were more concerned about the consequences of starving public services of much 
needed investment. This division was at the heart of long-held differences over the party’s 
identity between those who wanted to use the state to advance a liberal social and economic 
agenda, which would include interventions in the market to reduce inequality, and those 
libertarians who wanted to reduce the power of the state, especially in the economic sphere 
(Dale 2013; Perraudin 2015). The divisions might explain why, despite distancing the party 
from the Conservatives on investment on the public services, its policy on reducing the 
deficit was not substantially different from them. This internal tension was occasionally 
expressed in statements in the manifesto which made a virtue of fiscal rectitude at the 
expense of more socially progressive policies:  “For too long, sickness benefits were used as 
a way of parking people away from the unemployment statistics” (Liberal Democrats 2015: 
48). 
 
The Scottish National Party (SNP)’s manifesto was characterised by its demand that 
the policies of austerity should end, and proposed that an extra £140 million should be set 
aside to fund public services including the NHS (SNP 2015: 5). There was a commitment to 
tackle the deficit “as part of a medium term strategy to ensure prudent levels of debt are 
achieved” (SNP 2015: 4) but very little detail on precisely how this would be done and in 
what timescale. One advantage that the SNP had was that it was not competing with the 
Conservatives for seats and hence was not concerned with being viewed as insufficiently 
tough on the deficit. In that sense, Labour’s need to market its policies to English voters in 
Conservative/Labour marginal seats meant that it could not afford not to attempt to offer a 
credible plan to cut the deficit, a policy that could be interpreted in Scotland (especially by 
the SNP) as an extension of austerity.  
As parties that were never likely to play a significant role in the post-election 
government, it could be argued that UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) and the 
Green Party were under little pressure to compromise their principles and hence would have a 
freer rein than the other parties to construct an internally coherent and convincing brand. And 
this was borne out by the very short sections on the economy, with UKIP’s plan to reduce the 
deficit being merely a pledge that its MPs would pressurise the government into adhering to 
the current Treasury plan (UKIP 2015: 8); the Greens, as would be expected, proposed a 
more environmentally sustainable economy (Green Party 2015). UKIP’s reference to the 
problems of “political correctness” and multiculturalism appear to bolster its self-styled 
identity as a party that, unlike the mainstream parties, is prepared to speak its mind even 
when that makes some people uncomfortable. However, this did not mean that both parties 
were not concerned with their public image, and this can be seen in relation to their portrayal 
of their leaders.  Party leader Nigel Farage only featured once in the UKIP manifesto after the 
foreword, with each of its 28 sections introduced by the relevant party spokesperson (though 
in true ‘politically incorrect’ style UKIP refers to each, including when female, as a 
“spokesman”!) (UKIP 2015). Similarly, the foreword that party leader Natalie Bennett gave 
at the beginning of the Green Party manifesto masked her distinct lack of profile in the main 
body of the document. In the case of Farage, concerns that UKIP was viewed by the public as 
a ‘one-man band’ led the party to appoint a number of spokespersons in June 2014 to 
promote its policies and the manifesto reflects this push to give prominence to a wider range 
of politicians than have been associated with the party in the past (Morris 2014). Bennett’s 
lack of profile in the Green Party manifesto followed a series of poor media interviews. There 
was even a request to broadcasters from the Green Party that its only MP Caroline Lucas 
replace Bennett in some of the TV debates (Boffey 2015). This request was turned down but 
it is not surprising that Lucas was so prominent in the manifesto. Indeed, the frequent 
references to her work as an MP not only was an attempt to deflect attention from Bennett’s 
media appearances but also served to highlight the Green Party’s record when in actual 
power, albeit in the form of one seat in the House of Commons. 
To give their economic policies more credibility, both parties laid out very detailed 
and fully costed financial plans for the next parliament, with UKIP’s being subject to an 
independent audit by CEBR (Centre for Economics and Business Research). Superficially, it 
seems odd that parties that had little chance of being in a government after the election would 
expend so much time providing this amount of detail. There is a historical precedent for this 
in the detail that the Liberals and then the Liberal Democrats put into its manifestos during 
the twentieth century, even when the parties were at their lowest ebb. That was because, in 
the absence of real power, activists were motivated mainly by the chance to develop very 
detailed policies (Brack 2000: 16). It could also be argued that this also gives the impression 
that these are parties are to be taken seriously, an indication that, despite their self-proclaimed 
‘outsider’ status, the UKIP and Green party brands to a certain extent are intended to project 
‘responsibility’. This was especially important in relation to economic policy, an issue which 
gained more media coverage than all other policy issues in this election (Loughborough 
University 2015 and 2015a). That one of Natalie Bennett’s most disastrous media interviews 
involved her inability to adequately explain the cost of her party’s housing policy, 
demonstrated the Green party’s need to be able to articulate their economic policies even 
when they are not the centrepiece of the manifesto; this could be said to be true of UKIP too. 
However, this scrutiny of their economic policies was likely to have mainly benefited the 
party for whom this policy was the most associated, namely the Conservatives.  
 
The 2015 Manifestos as mini-campaigns and media events 
Because they also have a programmatic function, in that they offer a programme of 
government as well as selling a party’s brand, a key characteristic of  UK manifestos 
has been their growth over time. There has been a four-fold increase in the length of all 
parties’ manifestos from 1945-59 to 1983-97 (Kavanagh 2000: 5) and the the size of the 
2015 offerings are likely to have deterred all but the most devoted of political 
aficionados. Nonetheless, while it could be argued from survey evidence taken during 
the 2015 election that the electorate is not as well informed about each party’s 
manifesto as would be expected, a majority of voters recognised the NHS and the 
economy as being priorities for the Labour Party and the Conservatives respectively 
(British Election Study 2015). This suggests that some of the major manifesto 
commitments of the parties were resonating with a sizeable section of the public. Given 
the findings of a Loughborough University (2015 and 2015a) study that more than 40% 
of mainstream media coverage of the 2015 election was devoted to the so-called ‘horse-
race’, then how did parties’ get their message across?  
 From around the 2001 general election, parties started to reduce the number of, 
what hitherto had been daily, press conferences, as it was felt that these benefited 
journalists more than they did the parties (Gaber 2011: 265). This trend continued into 
subsequent elections, with the Liberal Democrats being the only leading party to hold 
one on most days in the 2010 campaign; indeed there was no one day in that campaign 
where all three of the main parties held a press conference (Gaber 2011: 265). These 
press conferences were replaced by a smaller number of what might be described as 
mini-campaigns. The Conservatives were much more advanced in moving towards this 
model of campaigning in the 2010 election, focusing mainly on ‘manifesto’ or 
‘contract’ launches fronted by David Cameron rather than press conferences, of which 
there were only three (Gaber 2011: 265).  
 A timeline of the 2015 election shows that it was the Labour Party that appeared 
to host more of these mini-campaigns. As far back as December 2014, a draft version of 
its manifesto, Changing Britain Together, was launched for public consultation (Labour 
List 2014). While there seems little difference in policy terms between the two 
iterations of the manifesto (Labour Party 2014 and 2015), this could be considered an 
effective way of fixing in the public mind its key messages, especially on the deficit, 
before the official campaign even started. In addition to the launch of its election 
manifesto on 13 April, the Labour Party unveiled an additional five specialist 
manifestos as well as, in the last week of the campaign, an election pledge stone 
(Moore 2015, see Chapter 7 for more detail). The other parties had fewer mini-
manifesto launches, but orchestrated or exploited a series of media events at crucial 
points during the campaign. Thus the Conservatives benefited from a letter from one 
hundred prominent business figures claiming that a Labour government would be bad 
for the economy which appeared two days after the latter launched its business 
manifesto (Moore 2015: 11-12). As only governing parties can do, the Conservatives 
and, to a lesser extent, the Liberal Democrats were helped by the surely not 
coincidental timing of “pension freedom day” on 6 April, which completely opened up 
pensioners’ retirement funds in order to allow them to spend or invest the money in any 
way they wished (Charles 2015).  
 Away from these formal launches, there was also a lot of marketing activity 
taking place online, with the Liberal Democrats and Greens in particular producing 
many different mini-manifestos to appeal to various demographics. This trend was 
evident as far back as the 2005 election, when Labour and the Liberal Democrats both 
produced separate women’s manifestos and this can be an effective means of, in 
marketing terms, appealing to different segments of the electorate. The development of 
and widespread access to broadband in the past 10-15 years has provided a cheap 
public platform for the hosting of these ancillary materials and the Greens and Liberal 
Democrats in particular exploited that. But the use of new media technologies can have 
mixed success, as illustrated by a video that the Liberal Democrats (2015a) produced to 
criticise the Labour’s Party’s launch of a separate manifesto for women. Opening with 
a woman washing-up, this attempt at satire largely failed, especially when it is 
considered that the Liberal Democrats produced many such discrete manifestos in the 
election as well as a women’s manifesto in 2005.  
 Despite all these additional activities, the continuing importance of the launches 
of the main manifestos was illustrated by the Conservative Party’s decision only days 
before it was due to take place to change the date of its launch to avoid a clash with the 
Labour Party’s so that, in its view, each would be subjected to a full day’s scrutiny 
(presumably from the mainly Conservative-supporting press) (ITV 2015).  
 
The election result 
Notwithstanding  the obvious danger in making an explicit link between the parties’ 
respective marketing of their manifestos and their performance in the election, I will 
nonetheless finish with a few observations about the role of political marketing in the 2015 
campaign.  
 The Conservatives concentration on the economy and the deficit was viewed as 
making for an uninspiring (Kellner 2015) and, up until the exit poll at 10pm on election night, 
unsuccessful campaign. But it was an effective campaign, in which the Conservative message 
was consistent and relentless – 55% of its candidates’ tweets were about the economy (Morris 
2015: 57) – and the party was helped by a press which was almost overwhelmingly anti-
Labour and a mainstream media which devoted one-third of policy discussion on its news 
programmes to the economy (Morris 2015: 20, 28, 57). The manifestos were part of the 
process of keeping the economy in the news, as one survey showed mainstream media 
interest in this policy peaking around the time of their launches (Morris 2015: 46). 
 The Conservatives’ brand focused, as it has in previous election, on its self-
proclaimed economic competence. It defined the debate on the deficit early in the 2010-2015 
parliament and, as such, all parties to a greater or lesser degree had to discuss this issue on the 
Conservatives’ terrain. This, in turn, established economic competence as the most important 
issue in the election. The Conservatives were thus able to more convincingly portray its 
policies as closer to the concerns of the electorate than the other parties. But, my caveat 
above about being reluctant to link branding and valence explicitly to the election result is 
reinforced by the observation that the Conservatives’ share of the overall vote was only 
36.9% (Shephard 2015: 29).    
Indeed, there is the intriguing question of whether many people voted for the 
Conservatives not out of great enthusiasm but in order to prevent a government in which the 
SNP would hold the balance of power. The fact that 25% of all voters and 38% of those who 
voted Conservative did not think that the election result gave the party a mandate to eliminate 
the deficit (The British Election Study Team 2015) suggests that many people went to bed on 
the night of 7 May with the expectation that the manifesto policies that they voted for would 
be diluted in coalition negotiations. Claims that there was a significant surge in the 
membership of the Liberal Democrats and the Labour Party in the week following the 
election (Beck 2015) might indicate that, while the Conservative manifesto was successful as 
a marketing product, the programmatic function of putting its mandated policies into 
legislation is proving to be less popular with a significant section of the public.    
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